Key Insights:
Throughout the month, Kremlin-aligned media in Lithuania intensified efforts to undermine trust in state institutions, distort public perceptions of national security, and portray the government as unstable, self-serving, and detached from ordinary people. Malign actors repeatedly exploited political disputes, civic controversies, and symbolic events to reinforce a narrative of Lithuania in permanent crisis. The most engaged and circulated storylines throughout the month of November included:
- Mocking Landsbergis’ Human Rights Award
Kremlin-aligned commentators intensely targeted former Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis after he received the 2025 Sergei Magnitsky Human Rights Award. They compared him to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, accusing him of “awarding himself medals” and calling the distinction a “parody of moral leadership.” The award was reframed as proof of alleged elite self-gratification, with claims that “medals are now given for destroying Lithuania,” aiming to delegitimize Lithuania’s human-rights advocacy and its pro-sanctions foreign policy.
- Belarusian balloon incidents
Coverage surrounding Belarusian air balloons that were temporarily disrupting airport operations was weaponized to suggest that the government orchestrated a “propaganda spectacle.” Kremlin-linked outlets argued that the border closure with Belarus was a “politically scripted act,” that airport restrictions lacked justification, and that citizens were being “psychologically trained to obey.” The narrative framed Lithuania as governed by fearmongering elites and tried to downplay the threat from Belarus.
- Escalating attacks on Lithuania’s leadership
Throughout the month, personal attacks against President Gitanas Nausėda, Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė, and Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys intensified. Viral posts demanded Nausėda’s resignation and accused top officials of “dismantling the state from within.” Ruginienė was targeted with claims that her government was on the brink of collapse, portrayed through headlines like “Political chaos – when will Ruginienė’s government fall?” Commentators pushed the broader message that Lithuania is run by “amateurs without vision” serving foreign agendas, reinforcing an image of directionless leadership.
- Accusations against LRT
The public broadcaster LRT became a central target following allegations that Prosecutor General Nida Grunskienė was shielding it from financial scrutiny. Kremlin-aligned media demanded audits, funding cuts, and punishment for supposed political protection. Simultaneously, broader existential narratives emerged: Lithuania was compared to a “second Ukraine,” threatened by moral collapse and corruption. Some narratives even characterized the country’s GDP as merely a “budget for fueling war,” claiming economic growth serves militaristic elites rather than citizens.
- First Lady Nausėdienė’s speech
The First Lady’s halting public address became a viral phenomenon across mainstream social platforms, generating memes, remixes, and widespread satire. While independent media treated the episode largely as a moment of public curiosity, Kremlin-aligned ecosystems barely engaged, choosing instead to maintain focus on anti-government narratives rather than cultural or social virality.
- Belarus sanctions dispute
A major narrative burst emerged from political disagreements over imposing new sanctions on Belarus. MP Remigijus Žemaitaitis opposed tighter measures, arguing that Lithuania “should not pick fights with neighbors” and claiming the proposal was not coordinated within the ruling coalition. Kremlin-aligned audiences amplified him as a rare voice of “common sense,” adding that perhaps citizens should impose sanctions “on the Seimas and Government” for their repeated provocations and obsession with “war and sanctions.” Simultaneously, Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys urged strengthening restrictions, describing Belarusian balloon launches as hybrid attacks. He was mocked as someone who “sees a combined attack everywhere,” reinforcing narratives that Lithuania’s security posture is hysterical, exaggerated, and out of touch with everyday concerns.
- Rejection of the state award
The initiative “Šilainių sodai” declined the Lithuanian Power Award from President Nausėda. Independent civic actors framed the refusal as an act of principle and integrity. Kremlin-aligned audiences, in contrast, ridiculed the move as “arrogant” and “ill-mannered,” yet used it opportunistically to attack Nausėda and paint the government as disliked, morally bankrupt, and disconnected from the public.
Taken together, this month’s disinformation efforts consistently portrayed Lithuania as a nation trapped in manufactured crises, governed by incompetent or malicious government, and manipulated through fear. By exploiting political disputes, security incidents, and civic actions, Kremlin-aligned media sought to deepen societal mistrust, weaken democratic cohesion, and erode confidence in the country’s institutions and strategic choices.
Overview of the findings:
- Throughout the month, Kremlin-aligned media in Lithuania further strengthened the anti-government narrative aimed at portraying the government as unstable, manipulative, and incapable of handling. Rather than focusing on individual events, malign actors repeatedly combined different developments into a single storyline: Lithuania is a failed state, collapsing under corrupt elites, fabricated security threats, and politically motivated chaos. A core narrative portrayed national leaders as self-serving figures disconnected from ordinary citizens. Whether mocking Gabrielius Landsbergis’ international recognition, attacking President Nausėda and Prime Minister Ruginienė, or ridiculing Foreign Minister Budrys, Kremlin-aligned outlets pushed the message that Lithuania is governed by incompetent actors who reward themselves while failing the country. Leadership was depicted as illegitimate, morally bankrupt, and deliberately destroying the state “from within.”
- Another persistent narrative framed Lithuania’s security environment as an artificial construct designed to control the population. The Belarusian balloon incidents, border restrictions, and hybrid-attack warnings were consistently interpreted as staged spectacles created to instill fear, justify sanctions, and maintain public obedience. This narrative sought to replace real security concerns with the idea that Lithuania’s government manufactures crises for political gain, simultaneously downplaying the threat from Russia and Belarus. At the same time, malign voices amplified a broader storyline of systemic national decline. Claims that institutions like LRT operate with “zero accountability,” comparisons to Ukraine’s “tragic fate,” and rhetoric about Lithuania’s GDP being used to “fuel war” all reinforced the notion of a state losing moral direction, economic stability, and sovereignty. The message was clear: Lithuania is fractured, corrupt, and heading towards total collapse.
- Domestic disagreements, whether over sanctions on Belarus, civic initiatives rejecting state awards, or everyday political disputes, were incorporated into this larger image of dysfunction. Every controversy was reframed as evidence that Lithuania’s government is divided, illegitimate, and out of touch with its people. Across all these narratives, the strategic goal to weaken public confidence in Lithuanian institutions, discredit the country’s security choices, and cultivate the impression of a nation in perpetual crisis, isolated from its allies and betrayed by its own leadership remained consistent.
- The YouScan media monitoring tool managed to capture 51,353 content pieces (slightly high number compared to the 49,224 pieces captured the previous month) throughout November related to pro-Kremlin media in Lithuania, including different posts, videos, tweets, and comments written under them.
- The graph below reflects daily engagement levels throughout November, showing several noticeable spikes in activity rather than a single dominant surge. These peaks are relatively similar in size, indicating that no single event drove the whole engagement. But instead, multiple narrative waves intensified at different points throughout the month. The largest spike, visible around November 17, does not appear to correspond to any specific, clearly identifiable event. Rather, it likely represents the cumulative effect of several overlapping anti-government narratives reaching peak amplification at once, rather than a reaction to one discrete development.
- Of the 50 most-engaged Kremlin-aligned media posts this month, 34 were YouTube videos; the rest were Facebook posts. Overall engagement rose by 3% compared to the previous month (520,694).
