Key insights:
In November, pro-Kremlin disinformation actors in Estonia focused on undermining trust in the rule of law, exploiting debates about Ukraine and “peace initiatives,” and framing both security measures and cultural decisions as evidence of censorship and Russophobia. Key narratives included:
- Criminal cases as “political persecution” – The detention of Oleg Besedin was portrayed as a crackdown on “independent journalism” and part of a broader campaign against the Russian-speaking community.
- Anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian framing of peace talks – Pro-Kremlin voices depicted Western-backed peace proposals as traps, argued that only Moscow is acting “realistically,” and suggested that the United States and EU are preparing to abandon Ukraine.
- Russophobia and cultural repression – The cancellation of Limp Bizkit’s concert and earlier cultural decisions were presented as proof that Estonia censors artists for political reasons and suppresses “unwanted” views.
- Security incidents as signs of state failure – School bomb-threat hoaxes and other security-related issues were used to question the competence of Estonian authorities and to allege unequal treatment of Russian-speaking institutions.
- Identity politics around local coalitions – Coalition talks in Narva and Tallinn were framed through simplistic labels (“pro-Kremlin” vs. “Russophobic”), turning complex local power-sharing arrangements into tools for polarizing Russian-speaking audiences.
These narratives aimed to weaken confidence in Estonia’s institutions, blur the line between legitimate security measures and censorship, and deepen divisions over Ukraine, language, and local political representation.
Overview of the Main Findings:
The month began with intense debate around the detention of Oleg Besedin by Estonia’s Internal Security Service. Pro-Kremlin commentators quickly framed the case as politically motivated, depicting Besedin as a victim of Russophobia and censorship rather than someone accused of sanction violations and collaboration with Russian interests. When media reports revealed that companies linked to Besedin had received substantial communication contracts from Tallinn city structures during the years of Centre Party rule, the case was immediately instrumentalized in domestic political competition. Social Democrats and other opposition actors used it to attack the Centre Party, while centrists tried to shift blame back onto their critics. Russian-speaking online commentators who traditionally backed the Centre Party reacted with confusion but, in many cases, eventually reverted to the familiar narrative that criminal proceedings against pro-Russian figures are “persecution of free speech.”
In parallel, a wave of bomb and violence threats targeting schools in Tallinn spread via Telegram and other channels. Estonian authorities treated the messages as part of an information operation rather than a concrete terrorist plot, increased police presence, and briefly moved some schools to distance learning. Pro-Kremlin voices seized on the incident to argue that the state was either overreacting or incapable of protecting its citizens, and some claimed that Russian-speaking schools were being neglected. These claims were not supported by evidence but fit longstanding narratives about institutional failure and unequal treatment.
Another major flashpoint was the announcement and subsequent cancellation of a planned Limp Bizkit concert in Tallinn. Once it was highlighted that frontman Fred Durst had expressed sympathy for Vladimir Putin, Estonia’s foreign and culture ministries signalled that such a performance would be unacceptable given Russia’s war against Ukraine. After organisers cancelled the event “for reasons beyond their control,” the online debate polarized rapidly. Critics – including some opposition politicians – condemned what they saw as government interference in cultural life and warned of censorship, while others welcomed the cancellation as a principled stance against pro-Kremlin artists. The controversy underlined the absence of a broad societal consensus on where to draw the line between artistic freedom and political responsibility, and created material that could easily be repurposed in hostile narratives portraying Estonia as illiberal.
Later in the month, attention shifted back to the war in Ukraine and to local coalition politics. Pro-Kremlin commentators dismissed a 28-point peace plan as a Western ruse, argued that Russia should push for maximal territorial gains, and claimed that the United States and Europe are quietly preparing to “dump” Ukraine. These messages were combined with economic arguments about sanctions allegedly harming Estonia more than Russia and doubts about the value of Western security guarantees. At the same time, coalition negotiations in Narva and Tallinn were framed through identity-based tropes: the emerging Narva coalition between the Stalnukhin and Raik lists was used to accuse opponents either of Russophobia or of legitimizing pro-Kremlin rhetoric, depending on the audience. In Tallinn, talks between the Centre Party and Isamaa – and the announcement that Peeter Raudsepp, not Mihhail Kõlvart, would become mayor – initially confused many Russian-speaking supporters. However, much of the reaction in Russian-language groups evolved into cautious optimism, particularly around promises to expand social support and to ease problems linked to the transition of schools to Estonian-language instruction.
Overall, November’s disinformation environment blended legal cases, security scares, culture-war disputes, and local coalition-building into a consistent set of narratives portraying Estonia as repressive, divided, and dependent on the West, while positioning Russia and its allies as more “realistic” and principled actors.
Story of the Month
In early November 2025, the Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO) detained Oleg Bessedin on suspicion of engaging in non-violent activities against the state and of violating EU sanctions. The authorities allege that, since at least 2022, Bessedin has cooperated with individuals tied to Russian intelligence services and has played a prominent role in Kremlin-led information influence operations. Prosecutors claim that he repeatedly disseminated content from sanctioned Russian media outlets via his pro-Kremlin Facebook group and YouTube channel, which they deem to be crimes against Estonia’s sovereignty.
The local court subsequently remanded him in custody for two months, citing the risk of his continuing to engage in such activities or fleeing the country. His arrest prompted widespread condemnation from pro-Kremlin figures and Russian-language media outlets, who framed the case as a “witch hunt” and evidence of mounting “Russophobia” in Estonia. Pro-Kremlin supporters described Bessedin as one of the few remaining voices for Russian speakers in Estonia and denounced the detention as the suppression of dissent, even though critics pointed out that his channels rarely featured genuine debate and consistently promoted Moscow-aligned narratives. The case has intensified debates about media pluralism, the role of Russian-language media in Estonia, and the boundaries between free speech and foreign influence operations.
